Abstract

This paper examines the possibility of coexistence (Mitsein) within the framework of Jean-Paul Sartre’s philosophy in Being and Nothingness, engaging in a critical dialogue with the Merleau-Pontian interpretation that denies such a possibility. The research revolves around a central question: Is the fundamental relation with the other an experience of alterity or of coexistence? Against Merleau-Ponty’s thesis—which posits coexistence as an originary phenomenon and reduces the Sartrean perspective to a secondary fact—we argue that Sartre integrates the communal dimension without abandoning the ontological primacy of alterity. To this end, three conceptual axes are examined: (1) the structural function of the look in the constitution of being-for-others; (2) Merleau-Ponty’s critique, which privileges a background of coexistence over alterity; and (3) Sartre’s notion of the “we-subject” as a psychological experience of community. In this way, we show that Sartre does indeed offer a theory of coexistence, though conceived as a fragile and secondary phenomenon. This allows us to reconsider the Sartre/Merleau-Ponty opposition not as a simple incompatibility, but as two antagonistic responses to the same question: Is alterity or coexistence the originary condition of my encounter with the other?